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Variations in state capacity in Latin America boil down to whether state agents, charged with implementing state policy, are recruit-
ed centrally and deployed rather than delegated or 
recruited among local elites. This, in short, is the 
argument that Temple University political scientist 
Hillel David Soifer puts forward in State Building 
in Latin America, an ambitious, wide-ranging, and 
well-written book.
Soifer looks at four coun-
tries—Mexico, Peru, Chile, and 
Colombia—and three areas of 
state policy: education, taxa-
tion, and military recruitment. 
He argues that in the first three countries, char-
acterized by a dominant capital city (or what 
he calls “urban primacy”) and a “unified politi-
cal economy,” state-building projects were initi-
ated but had different outcomes. In Colombia, 
where power was dispersed among a number of 
regions and regional elites, no state-building proj-
ect emerged. In those countries where state agents 
were deployed, such as Chile, state building was 
successful. In countries where state agents were at 
times deployed and at other times delegated, such 
as Mexico and Peru, state building was a mixed 
bag. Deployed state agents, in short, feature in this 
book as the magic bullet of state building. 
The policy implication is simple: If you want 
state building to succeed, you should deploy state 
agents rather than delegate state policy to local 
elites. Or, as Soifer concludes, architects of the 
state should build “alliances through elected posi-
tions rather than through administrative appoint-
ments.”
I am less interested in whether Soifer is right 
or wrong about deployment being superior to del-
egation in accounting for successful state build-
ing. More interesting to me is what this book tells 
us about how a particular type of political science 
scholarship addresses state building and the state 
more generally, the methods it uses in so doing, 
and in particular, the relations it establishes with 
another discipline, history.
HISTORY AS DATA
In developing his argument, Soifer focuses 
on what he calls Latin America’s “Liberal era,” 
which lasted from the 1840s to about the 1920s, 
and engages in what he calls 
“detailed historical study.” Yet, 
in my view, his engagement with 
history is problematic. To begin 
with, history, both in the sense 
of the past and in the sense of 
the work that historians do—which is to say, his-
toriography—is reduced in this book to “data.” 
Historians, this book appears to suggest, do not 
produce arguments but instead merely gather facts.
Moreover, Soifer’s approach is based on zero-
sum logic. For his argument to be correct, Soifer 
believes, all other explanations of variations in 
state building must be wrong. However, the idea 
that successful or failed state building over nearly 
a century, or that variations among countries as 
different and complex as Mexico, Peru, Chile, and 
Colombia can be explained by a single variable, is 
questionable.
In developing this argument, Soifer draws 
primarily on secondary literature (“material”—
that is, data—“in the voluminous collection of 
national and regional histories”) and “extensive 
primary source research in the archives of govern-
ment ministries.” Although Soifer’s “works cited” 
section runs to almost 30 pages, it is striking that 
much of his material in fact is extracted from a 
rather narrow set of such sources.
Take the case of Peru. About a dozen studies, 
largely monographs, provide the “data” for the 
three chapters on education, taxation, and mili-
tary conscription in that nation. Some of these are 
certainly relevant to the study, but the majority 
focus on quite different issues than those that 
interest Soifer. Florencia Mallon’s book on the 
development of capitalist relations of production 
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in the central highlands and Nils Jacobsen’s book 
on the political economy of the southern high-
lands, for instance, only marginally address the 
issues covered in Soifer’s book. Even when put 
together, they provide at best a partial and provi-
sional account of, say, the development of educa-
tion policy across the whole of the country in the 
period under review. Moreover, there are impor-
tant omissions. (In the case of education, the key 
work of Antonio Espinoza gets no mention at all.) 
The primary sources that Soifer draws on (and 
puts to good use in several chapters) are, in fact, 
printed sources, namely government reports and 
official documents, including official newspapers.
Throughout, Soifer establishes a clear distinc-
tion between scholarship that provides arguments 
his book is in dialogue with and scholarship that 
is a source of data. The first type of scholarship 
consists of studies rather like his own, written by 
nonhistorians who draw on history as a source of 
data to produce “big” theories of state building 
that, like Soifer’s, isolate a magic-bullet explana-
tion for success and failure. 
This scholarship (he cites half 
a dozen authors) is discussed 
in the introduction in some 
detail and revisited in the con-
clusion.
The second type of scholar-
ship is absent from the intro-
duction and the conclusion but is present in the 
rest of the book. It is a scholarship that provides 
the “material” about education, taxation, and 
military conscription in the four countries sur-
veyed. This literature’s contributions to the his-
tory of, say, Mexico or Peru get little attention. 
Major debates in this literature, which impinge 
on the book’s argument, are rarely acknowledged 
and when they are, they are relegated to a footnote 
(see, for example, the footnotes on page 92 and 
page 103). This constitutes, in my view, a weak-
ness of the book: Soifer misses an opportunity 
to engage fully with the interpretations of state 
building that these studies put forward.
Soifer claims that one of his key contributions 
is that he takes ideas seriously. Indeed, he places 
much emphasis on what he terms “the ideational 
foundations of state-building projects.” In the 
conclusion, he asserts that we should “consider 
the possibility that state leaders’ decision making 
about how to pursue development is shaped by 
their ideological visions.” Of course, historians 
have considered this possibility for many years. 
Indeed, many have written extensively about it, 
including many of those whose work he draws 
on here but does not engage at the level of argu-
ment. But Soifer presents it in his conclusions as 
an original insight. It is an original insight to him 
because he is engaged in narrow dialogue with 
a handful of authors “who downplay the role of 
ideas.” 
This narrow engagement is equally problem-
atic when it comes to the issue at hand: the state. 
Soifer pays no attention to state theory beyond 
the work of Max Weber and Michael Mann (with 
an occasional reference to James Scott). Extensive 
scholarship on the cultural formation of the state 
and on the anthropology of the state, some of 
which deals with the countries he examines, is 
ignored. As a consequence, the state is never prop-
erly theorized or unpacked in this book.
DEPLOYED RULE
In developing his argument, Soifer tosses aside a 
series of “alternative explanations” put forward by 
those scholars he does engage 
with—who, for the most part, 
approach the issue of state 
building in a similar way, by 
isolating a key variable that 
they believe explains varia-
tions across several countries. 
None of these explanations 
are acceptable to Soifer or deemed in any way 
compatible with his own explanation. Geography 
plays no role in state-building outcomes, Soifer 
suggests. No other historical periods—neither the 
colonial period nor the wars of independence—
can account for variations in state building among 
countries. Federalism is not an important factor 
in accounting for the ability of the state to tax the 
population. And so forth.
Instead, Soifer stresses the unique importance 
of what he terms deployed rule. In Colombia, 
where no single city dominated, he argues there 
were no national elites, only regional elites, and 
so there could be no state-building project, and 
no one to deploy state administrators. Thus, 
in Colombia, he traces “state weakness to the 
absence of a state-building project”: Colombian 
elites did not develop an education policy, and 
they were unable, indeed reluctant, to tax the 
population, or to raise a national army.
In the other three countries, by contrast, the 
existence of urban primacy (big capital cities like 
Santiago, Mexico City, and Lima) and elites who 
State-building projects 
emanated from the periphery 
as well as from the center.
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favored national development efforts based on 
expanding state capacity produced state-building 
projects. These projects were more successful in 
Chile, where state administrators in charge of edu-
cation policy, tax collecting, or military conscrip-
tion were deployed at the regional level; they met 
little resistance and even a degree of acceptance 
from local elites. 
In the Mexican and Peruvian cases, success 
varied over time and across space. In Peru, Soifer 
contrasts the guano era (1840s–1870s), charac-
terized by delegated state agents and unsuccess-
ful state building, with the Aristocratic Republic 
(1895–1919), which had deployed state agents and 
more successful state building. In Mexico, Soifer 
contrasts the experience of two states, Sonora 
and Michoacán. In Sonora, conflict between local 
elites and state officials resulted in relatively suc-
cessful implementation, from the outside, of an 
education policy. In Michoacán, local elites cap-
tured state roles; consequently, education reform 
made little progress.
ANOTHER COUNTRY
There are several problems with this argument. 
To begin with, Soifer’s own data show that even in 
Chile, deployed state agents were a minority—less 
than 20 percent of all appointments. So this is 
not so much a story about deployed versus del-
egated state agents, but rather about the impact of 
minorities of deployed state agents on the course 
of state-building projects in these countries. What 
proportion of successful state building in Chile, 
we could reasonably ask, should be attributed to 
the 80 percent of delegated state agents? 
More generally, the case for state weakness 
or strength that Soifer develops in each case is 
often circular, as should already be evident from 
the brief discussion of the Colombian case above 
(the argument being that the state in Colombia 
was weak because there was no state building). 
Was the Peruvian state’s weakness a cause of its 
inability to raise taxes or a consequence? Was 
Chile’s successful military conscription the rea-
son for the strength of its state or a consequence? 
This is not clarified in the text. The analysis 
never quite probes deep enough—we never hear 
the voices of those whose lives were affected by 
such processes. At best, their motivations are 
inferred and generalized.
My main criticism of Soifer’s book, however, 
is that in failing to engage with the arguments 
put forward by historians of state building in 
Latin America, or with the extensive literature 
on the cultural formation and the anthropology 
of the state, he never really goes beyond a partial 
understanding of the development of the state in 
the four countries he surveys. Soifer fails to ask 
what the state in fact is (he assumes that it is a 
Weberian-style bureaucracy) and how different 
conceptions of the state might produce different 
readings of the material he draws on. 
Nor does he ask how the state is understood 
and experienced and, in turn, constituted by the 
people who are its agents or its objects. He never 
really inquires whether the meaning of the state 
varies from one locality to another or whether 
there are differences in how the state operates in 
the center and at its margins. In his vision, Peru, 
to take one case, was populated by central elites 
who wanted to build the state and local elites who 
wanted to resist it. But he never really stops to 
think about how the Peruvian state was also being 
built as those peripheral elites—and indeed non-
elites, too—engaged with it. State-building proj-
ects emanated from the periphery as well as from 
the center in Peru in the Liberal era, as historians 
and anthropologists, including several cited by 
Soifer, have shown.
In the end, my reservations about the book 
could be explained by the differences that exist 
between our disciplines’ approaches to engaging 
with the past and between our own approaches to 
the study of the state, a topic which was the focus 
of my book The Allure of Labor: Workers, Race, 
and the Making of the Peruvian State, published in 
2011. As the glowing blurbs on the back of Soifer’s 
book suggest, it will find an audience among 
political scientists and political sociologists. 
Historians of Latin America may share my 
sense of frustration at the way in which historical 
scholarship on the region is reduced to data in this 
book. Students of the state, particularly those who 
draw on the literature about the cultural formation 
of the state and on anthropological studies, may 
be disappointed by the ways in which this book 
fails to move beyond a Weberian understanding 
of the state or to recognize that other concep-
tions of the state exist and provide useful insight 
into state building. In this sense, perhaps, Soifer’s 
book illustrates the limits of current celebrations 
of interdisciplinarity and cross-disciplinary theo-
retical engagement. Political science is another 
country; they do things differently there. !
